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ABSTRACT:
Contemporary Australian local government faces several daunting
problems, not least escalating financial un-sustainability and local infrastructure
depletion. The main response of the various state and territory governments has taken the
form of a series structural reform programs, with a strong emphasis on forced
amalgamation. However, widespread dissatisfaction with the consequences of these
compulsory consolidation programs has led to a search for alternative policy solutions
based largely on shared services and various types of regional co-operation between local
councils. This paper seeks to place proposed ‘regional’ solutions to contemporary
problems in historical perspective by providing a comparative account of three distinct
federal government initiatives of ‘region-directed’ policy in the post-World Two era: the
‘nation-building’ of the 1940s; the ‘paternalism’ of the 1970s; and ‘self-sufficiency’ of the
1990s. We argue that, not withstanding the complex relationship between historical
circumstances and changing state-federal relations, important lessons for current local
government policy making can be learnt from a critical assessment of these episodes of
federal intervention at the regional level.

1. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary Australian local government is beset by a number of difficult
problems. Three distinct constellations of economic and political forces seem to
have led to these problems. Firstly, grinding ongoing financial distress has given
rise to grave concerns over the financial sustainability of many local authorities,
particularly in regional, rural and remote areas of the country. In a path-breaking
report, the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC 2001, pp. 52-3) identified
five chief causes for the financial crisis in Australian local government: (i)
‘Devolution’ – where a higher tier of government obliges local councils to
assume new functions; (ii) ‘Raising the Bar’ – where a higher level of
1
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government, through legislative enactments, increases the complexity and/or
standard of provision of local government services thus raising costs; (iii) ‘Cost
Shifting’ – where a municipal council provides a service for federal or state
government agencies without adequate financial compensation and where a
higher tier of government no longer provides an essential service thereby forcing
a local authority to accept responsibility; (iv) ‘Increased Community
Expectations’ – where local communities demand improvements to local
services or the provision of an entirely new service; and (v) ‘Policy Choice’ –
where a given council voluntarily expands or improves services. In addition,
local councils are also sometimes partially responsible for their financial
problems; for example, in many instances local councils have been reluctant to
strike rates and other charges and fees at realistic levels (Johnson, 2003).
As a consequence of these financial pressures, existing service provision
arrangements have been maintained only at the cost of depreciating local
infrastructure. This has obvious dire long-run implications for local government.
In this regard, in its Final Report Rates and Taxes: A Fair Share for Responsible
Local Government, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on
Economics, Finance and Public Administration (2003a, p. 59) noted that ‘there is
a significant infrastructure renewal gap across the country and asset standards are
decreasing’.
Secondly, there is ongoing concern by all state and territory government
policy makers over the operational efficiency of local authorities, especially
small regional and rural councils. The primary policy instrument for addressing
this perceived problem has been structural reform, with a strong emphasis on
council amalgamations (Vince 1997). During the 1990’s, South Australia,
Tasmania and Victoria all experienced compulsory consolidation programs and
more recently New South Wales and Queensland have also undergone
compulsory amalgamation. At the time writing the Northern Territory is poised
for drastic structural reorganisation. Only Western Australia has thus far escaped
unscathed.
Thirdly, in the past two decades the various enabling acts of the different
Australian local government jurisdictions have been amended to give local
councils greater latitude in conducting their affairs. This has led to a substantial
expansion of the role of local government and growing complexity in its
relationships with state and federal governments (Dollery, Wallis and Allan,
2006). In this regard, the National Office of Local Government (NOLG) Annual
Report for 2000-01 pointed to the excessively complicated intergovernmental
institutions, which involved the Council of Australian Governments, in excess of
forty Commonwealth-State Ministerial Councils and fora, the Local Government
and Planning Ministers’ Council, and numerous other ministerial councils, many
of which affect local government (NOLG, 2003, p. 8).
In addition, significant differences in the functions of the different state local
government jurisdictions have widened (Marshall, 2008, pp. 23-27). As a result,
state government oversight mechanisms are now dissimilar, which has served to
diminish the possibility of a uniform national approach to local government.
Moreover, an uneven devolution of additional functions to local councils both
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within and between the state and territory local government systems has further
complicated the pattern of intergovernmental relations.
Various solutions have been proposed to tackle these problems. As we have
seen, amalgamation has been the main weapon in the arsenal of policy
instruments employed in local government reform. However, the results of
council merger programs have proved disappointing. This disillusionment has
followed a series of national and state-based inquiries into financial sustainability
into local government.
For instance, the South Australian Financial
Sustainability Review Board’s (FSRB) (2005) Rising to the Challenge report
defined financial sustainability and then assessed South Australian councils
against this measure. Along similar lines, the Independent Inquiry into the
Financial Sustainability (LGI) for the New South Wales Local Government
Association (2006) sought to determine financial sustainability in New South
Wales local government. More recently, an independent survey of one hundred
of New South Wales’ most populated councils found that over one third are
‘financially unsustainable’ (FiscalStar Services Pty Ltd, 2008: pp. 4 and 11).
Both the (now defunct) Queensland Local Government Association’s (LGAQ)
(2006) Size, Shape and Sustainability (SSS) program and the Western Australian
Local Government Association’s (WALGA) (2006) Systemic Sustainability
Study Inquiry considered financial sustainability in their respective local
government systems, as did a report commissioned by the Local Government
Association of Tasmania (LGAT) (2007). At the national level, a study by
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006) entitled the National Financial Sustainability
Study of Local Government examined the problem of financial sustainability in
local government.
These inquiries all found widespread problems of financial sustainability in
may local councils, regardless of whether amalgamation had occurred in the
jurisdiction in question. Moreover, they were unanimous in dismissing
amalgamation as a ‘magic bullet’ for tackling financial problems. An important
consequence of these deliberations has been a growing scepticism over the
unsatisfactory economic, political and social outcomes of council amalgamations
(Dollery, Byrnes and Crase, 2007a).
As a result, alternative solutions have been canvassed. Three main avenues
have been explored. In the first place, some commentators have called for
additional sources of revenue. For example, Byrnes, Dollery, Crase and
Simmons (2008) have proposed a municipal bond issue on the Australian equity
market. Secondly, others have called for greater funding from higher tiers of
government, including the establishment of a Commonwealth Local
Infrastructure Fund (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006; Dollery, Byrnes and Crase,
2007b). Thirdly, and most importantly, local councils across Australia have
explored models of local government that present alternatives to amalgamation.
These models are usually based on shared service arrangements and have
displayed high levels of ingenuity (see, for instance, Dollery and Crase 2006). In
other words, shared services now represent the most important method of
tackling the problems of contemporary Australian local government.
However, the ongoing debate has ignored a potentially crucial aspect of the
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move towards shared service models, which has been obliquely touched, but not
examined in the WALGA Systemic Sustainability Study Inquiry (2006) with its
Regional Model. In essence, this ‘elephant in the room’ resides in the impetus
shared services give to the evolution of existing local government towards a
system of regional government. This paper seeks to remedy this neglect in the
literature by evaluating three historical antecedents of regionalisation in
Australia in an effort to draw lessons from these failed episodes in
Commonwealth policy that may help inform contemporary policy making. To
this end, we consider (i) the ‘nation-building’ of the 1940s; (ii) the ‘paternalism’
which characterised the drive to regional socio-economic equity in the 1970s;
and (iii) the ‘self-sufficiency’ of the 1990s. All these attempts were ‘top-down’
in nature and as such have embodied ‘regionalisation’, i. e. the initiation of
structures designed by higher level of government, as opposed to ‘regionalism’,
i. e. the initiation of structures from local and regional areas themselves (Gray,
2004). Interestingly, it was federal Labor Governments that pushed ahead with
policies of regionalisation.
The paper is divided into five main parts. Section 2 discusses the
Commonwealth government’s first major initiative in regionalisation in the
1940s. Section 3 tackles the Commonwealth’s second important initiative in the
early 1970s. Section 4 contemplates the Commonwealth’s third initiative the
1990s. Section 5 considers subsequent policy making in the area. The paper
ends by attempting to extract some useful lessons in a brief concluding section 6.
2. THE COMMONWEALTH’S
BUILDING IN THE 1940s

FIRST

INITIATIVE:

NATION

The Commonwealth first directed its attention toward regional Australia as a
specific policy concern under PM John Curtin and the Minister for Post-War
Construction and later PM Ben Chifley. According to Sandercock (1975),
underlying socio-economic policy objectives included the utilisation of natural
resources, defence imperatives and urban decentralisation. A plan for regional
infrastructure and resource development arose through a series of
Commonwealth/state conferences, culminating in 1949 with the publication of
Regional Planning in Australia (Commonwealth Department of Post-War
Reconstruction (CDPWR)). This was preceded by other reports on public
housing and social welfare which also encompassed regional planning (Reddel,
2005, p. 188). The CDPWR ‘attracted a variety of talented visionaries
preoccupied with creating a better social climate’ (McMullin, 2000, p. 245),
seeking national reconstruction by ensuring equitable living standards based on
secure male employment, adequate housing and planned communities.. For
social impact to be achieved, the CDPWR encouraged coordinated resource
development in under-populated rural areas (Harris, 1976, pp. 108-9; Taylor and
Garlick; 1989, p. 80).
Under the CDPWR, the nation was divided into almost 100 regions leading
to, in many instances, the establishment of ‘regional development committees’
(RDCs) that were expected to prepare resource inventories and regional plans
‘directed towards the full development of the region’s resources in order to

Regional Development, Local Government & Federal Intervention

175

maintain the maximum population’ (CDPWR, 1949, p. 18; see also Harris, 1989,
p. 109; Neutze, 1989, p. 50). The CDPWR’s purview extended beyond
‘physical’ resources (listed as climate, physiography, water, soil, minerals,
vegetation, fisheries and land-use) to ‘economic resources’ such as industrial
development and ‘social resources’, including housing, hotels and hospitals
(1949, pp. 21-4). The Commonwealth and state Governments determined the
regional boundaries together (Dore et al, 2003, p. 158). RDCs were founded
with significant Local Government representation, although composition varied
between jurisdictions. Municipal representatives generally comprised 50 per
cent of membership, whilst the remainder consisted of ‘three or four senior
officers of State Government departments resident in the region and two or three
members who [were] prominent in commerce or secondary industries of the
region’ (CDPWR, 1949, p. 17; see also Harris, 1989 p. 108). The number of
council delegates reflected the Commonwealth’s belief that councils could break
out from their straitjacket of ‘wastebin’ functions to regional cooperation on
broader issues.
With national prosperity being the driving objective, there was substantial
faith in the development potential of seemingly under-utilised regions, such as
the Murray Valley (Orchard, 1999a, p. 20). The subsequent Minister for PostWar Reconstruction under PM Chifley, John Dedman, stressed in the CDPWR
foreword (1949, p. 3) that ‘scientific study’ and the ‘careful working out of longrange plans’ were vital in obtaining the ‘best use ... of our resources’. This
reflected the emerging notion of ‘wise use’ principles to guide and promote
natural resource development (Frawley, 1994, p. 66), underscored by a complex
interplay of social ideals and embryonic science. Regionalisation provided an
attractive administrative framework for this to occur. Because modern
environmentalism of the 1960s/1970s had yet to dawn, the CDPWR Report
contained no reference to conservation other than listing ‘natural vegetation’ as a
subset of ‘physical resources’. (1949, p. 22).
Regional boundaries tended to observe council perimeters as ‘building
blocks’. The CDPWR believed that only ‘small differences’ existed between
physiographic regional boundaries and Local Government borders, basing its
functional regions mainly on physical factors such as “fundamental unity in
topography” but also economic features and communities of interest (1949, p.
22). This was despite some of the archaic council borders based on old police
districts (Power, Wettenhall & Halligan, 1981, p. 8; Barrett, 1979, p. 70;
Larcombe, 1973, pp. 210-12). Reliance on council borders would have offered
considerable convenience due to the CDPWR’s intention to rely on individual
councils to collect important information (1949, p. 22). More importantly, it
would have also reflected ‘communities of interest’ derived from ‘cultural and
historical legac[ies]’ that had emerged from democratically elected councils with
their headquarters at the centre of town (Dollery, Crase and Johnson, 2006, p.
150).
In 1949, the newly elected conservative Government led by PM Robert
Menzies abandoned the scheme and returned all regional development policy to
the states. But it seems that the program had already suffered from deep-rooted
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problems.
Neutze noteed that whilst some plans reached completion,
implementation received insufficient attention (1989, pp. 50-1; see also
Sandercock, 1975, p. 106). The CDPWR’s own report failed to address this
crucial element. Taylor observed that cost implications were ‘barely addressed’
(1990, p. 57), whilst Wettenhall and Power lamented that ‘debates of the period
never explained clearly what was to happen to existing State and local units’
(1975, p. 201). There must have been grave concern in some quarters that
regional bodies set up by the Commonwealth might comprise one step towards
reorganisation of the federal framework. Whilst the CDPWR stressed that
regional planning was ‘a matter primarily for the states’ (1949, p. 15), it provided
little or no policy indication of how this was to happen. Despite an express
desire to avoid trespass on State jurisdiction (CDPWR, 1949, pp. 3, 15-6 and
18), political suspicion and resentment increased (Lloyd and Troy, 1981, pp. 123; Orchard, 1999a, p. 21). Wettenhall and Power (1975, p. 201) observe that by
the late 1940s, the ‘mood’ of the nation was ‘anti-planning and avowedly profederalist’. But as we will see, intergovernmental conflict was to continue
throughout all Commonwealth attempts to establish potentially strong regional
institutions (Dore et al, 2003, p. 159).
This jurisdictional tension within the federal system highlights the question
of local government’s role in this nation building phase of regional policy. PM
Curtin himself had recognised local government’s inherent interest in assisting
local economies (CDPWR, 1949, p. 1). His successor, PM Chifley, was indeed a
member of his local authority, the then Abercrombie Shire Council in the NSW
Central West. The CDPWR regarded councils as ‘most intimately concerned
with conservation and development of regional resources’ (1949, p. 16). But
there is little mention in the Report of a role for local government beyond
feeding information into the inventories. Whilst the Report refers to councils
being advised of regional plans through the RDCs (CDPWR, 1949, p. 19), there
is nothing beyond passing reference about how councils might have given effect
to them. This is not surprising. At that stage, Local Government’s functional
activity was narrow and primitive (Maiden, 1966, p. 128; Purdie, 1976, p. 37).
Councils had no background at all in strategic planning. Furthermore, having
been weaned on subservience to colonial and state governments, they had
minimal experience in entering into partnerships with other spheres of
government. In short, local government was ill-equipped to seize opportunity
from a poorly planned, albeit well-intentioned scheme, despite the initial
involvement of local representatives.
3. THE COMMONWEALTH’S SECOND INITIATIVE: PATERNALISM
IN THE EARLY 1970s
The municipal and regional terrain again underwent dramatic change after the
1972 federal election of the Labor Whitlam Government, which sought a closer
relationship with local government. In his pre-election policy speech, future PM
Gough Whitlam promised that Labor would ‘make local government a genuine
partner in the federal system’ (quoted in Wettenhall and Power, 1975, p. 203).
Furthermore, he believed that ‘some programs and services of government
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[were] most efficiently and effectively planned, coordinated, and delivered at a
level intermediate to those of state and local government’ (press statement
quoted in Harris, 1976, p. 101). The result, according to Jones (1989, p. 163),
was local government’s rescue from ‘long-term decline and impending
irrelevance’. Labor saw local government as a convenient mechanism through
which to pursue regional fiscal equalisation in terms of equity of access to public
services, especially in poorer outer metropolitan areas (Taylor and Garlick, 1989,
p. 81). This arguably led to a major opportunity for local government to enter
the national stage. The rhetoric and policy trajectory stood in contrast with the
previous conservative government’s establishment of the National Urban and
Regional Development Authority, whose main task was to advise the Prime
Minister, William McMahon, and guide the making of grants to the states on
urban and regional matters (Lloyd and Troy, 1981, pp. 20-1). But this was to be
shut down by tumultuous change under PM Whitlam.
At least two major and directly related policy shifts arose. First, an overhaul
of the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) led to substantial injection of
funding to local authorities. This had to be carried out via the states because
direct funding to local government is constitutionally unlawful. A referendum
launched by the Whitlam government to overcome this problem was
unsuccessful. Nevertheless, a new financial nexus between municipal and
Commonwealth governments via the state governments provided a foundation
for local government’s maturity. The system, subject to sequential structural
change (Johnson, 2003, p. 53), is still in place. Significantly, because the grants
are unconditional, there is no assurance on how the moneys are spent.
According to the Commonwealth, the main object of the ‘general purpose’
component of ‘federal assistance grants’ (FAGs) is to ‘strengthen’ local
government and ‘promote equity between councils’ (Department of Transport
and Regional Services (Cth), 2003, p. 29). Together with local rates, the FAG
mechanism remains a centrepiece of Australian local government revenue.
Second, the Whitlam Government developed a novel way to disperse FAG
revenue. Councils could only apply for funding through compulsorily
established ROCs (originally known as ‘regional assemblies’), a fresh regional
structure established by Minister Uren’s Department of Urban and Regional
Development (DURD). Whilst the legislation enabled grants to be made directly
to the ROCs themselves, this never took place (Else-Mitchell, 1976, p. 191;
Fulop and Sheppard, 1988a, p. 6). Instead, the ROCs served as funding conduits
for FAGs and other funding schemes (Advisory Council for Inter-Governmental
Relations, 1986, p 55; Lloyd and Troy, 1981, pp. 157-192; Parker, 1978, p. 407;
Miles, 1976, p. 180; Hawker, 1975, p. 28). In his autobiography, Uren described
FAGs as ‘the beginning of an evolutionary process that … changed local …
politics forever’ (1994, p. 270). Their purpose was not to supplement rate
income but, in PM Whitlam’s own words, to enable poorer councils ‘to provide a
standard of services to their communities that will be comparable with that
enjoyed by communities elsewhere’ (House of Representatives Parliamentary
Debates, Hansard, 17 May 1973, 2304; see also Else-Mitchell, 1978, p. 75; Self,
1985, pp. 4, 46-7; DURD, 1975, p. 4). In order to move forward to regional
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social equity, the CGC undertook the complex task of surveying areas
throughout the nation in terms of revenue-raising capacities and expenditure
disabilities (Thomson, 1979, p. 90).
Membership of the Department of Urban and Regional Development’s ROCs
was limited to local government, with about 80 bodies inaugurated (Osborn and
Robin, 1989, p. 51). Importantly, unlike the previous RDC system, the ROC
system included metropolitan areas (Fulop and Sheppard, 1988b, p. 615; Huxley,
2000, p. 132). This highlights the peculiarity of countless current references to
‘regional’ Australia as meaning ‘non-urban’ Australia. As soon as one moves
away from rural physiographic factors alone, social and economic dimensions
demand inclusion of metropolitan areas and, indeed, the wider landscape.
The DURD invested substantial research into choosing relevant council
boundaries, dismissing the 1940s lines as ‘somewhat arbitrary’ (DURD, 1975, p.
11). It divided metropolitan areas by means of socio-economic data whilst
identifying rural regions through analyses of ‘interaction of people and
activities’, with most attention given to the methodologically interesting notion
of telephone traffic (DURD, 1975, pp. 7-8, 19). Ecological factors played no
role at all. Although the DURD did intend at a later stage to map ‘large
ecosystems’ throughout Australia (DURD, 1975, p. 19), the system was
disbanded before such opportunity arose. The Commonwealth never recognised
natural resource management as an obvious ROC function. The primary aim
was to help ‘minimise spatial economic and social inequities’ across regions
through direct participation by a better-funded local government (Taylor and
Garlick, 1989, p. 81).
The Whitlam/Uren ROCs never became major forces. The CGC regarded
them as mere ‘administrative devices’ or ‘post-offices’ that collated funding
submissions (Hawker, 1975, p. 28; see also Miles, 1976, p. 180; Parker, 1978, p.
407). Fulop and Sheppard (1988b, p. 615) describe the CGC as a politically
conservative bureaucracy that refused to cooperate in what it saw as an intrusion
into state territory. In any case, the level of CGC grants received by councils
comprised ‘a relatively minor part of that Government’s spending on urban and
regional development’ (Manning, 1992, p. 50).
While the ROC system was driven by the underlying idea of socio-economic
equity, it was only one of several regionalisation initiatives under the
Whitlam/Uren government, with these other initiatives reflecting the paternalism
of the administration more precisely. The Commonwealth instituted the
Australia Assistance Plan (AAP), which established Regional Councils for
Social Development to coordinate social welfare programs. These were very
different to ROCs, being based on fresh boundaries and ‘controlled by citizen’s
groups’ rather than councils (Fulop and Sheppard, 1988b, p. 616). This
imposition of jurisdiction by federal government helped fuel municipal
discontent with Commonwealth regional policy. Fulop and Sheppard noted that
councils ‘either avoided the AAP or … played an obstructionist role’ (1988b, p.
615; see also Reddel, 2005, p. 191). Another strong regional scheme was the
doomed Growth Centre Program, designed to facilitate decentralisation to
selected centres with improved services. There were also further DURD
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projects, including the Area Improvement Program (AIP), which assisted the
sustainability of active ROCs. Whilst the AIP placed emphasis on particular
welfare, employment and infrastructural projects (Huxley, 2000, p. 133), in
many circumstances it ceded total discretion on expenditure to ROCs and local
authorities. In one instance, funds were used for controversial parkland
development at Auburn in western Sydney, involving construction of an artificial
hill (Lloyd and Troy, 1981, pp. 45-57). Interestingly, the location is now
recognised by the local council as having significant potential for a habitat
corridor, containing remnant patches of important ecological communities and an
endangered plant species.
Power and Wettenhall (1976, p. 122) claim that other Commonwealth
authorities were ‘not far behind’ in developing ‘comprehensive regionalising
schemes’. But the abundance of regional programs was poorly coordinated
(Harris, 1976, p. 109; Wettenhall and Power, 1975, p. 207). Power and
Wettenhall (1976, p. 119) go as far as to portray ‘veritable chaos’. It must have
provided a confusing milieu for local government which, apart from distant
memories of the 1940s, was unfamiliar with Commonwealth interest, let alone
enforced regional structures. Those councils that did exploit the ROC
mechanism were far more interested in receiving money to supplement rate
revenue and repay debts rather than embracing the Commonwealth’s regional
vision (Power and Wettenhall, 1976, p. 123; Fulop and Sheppard, 1988b, p. 615;
Daly, 2000, p. 214).
State governments resented interference with their traditional jurisdictional
territory, viewing the ROCs as an unnecessary tier of government that threatened
their own power base. Councils adopted a similar view notwithstanding that
DURD sought to strengthen local government’s financial muscle (Chapman,
1997, p. 46; Harris, 1989, p. 120). The Commonwealth insisted that the ROC
network could ‘eventually lead to permanent forms of regional organisations
without necessarily disrupting existing systems’ (DURD, 1975, p. 2). Yet local
government remained generally suspicious, seeing ROCs as a first step towards
dismantling individual authorities (Chapman, 1997, p. 46; Harris, 1989, p. 120;
Miles, 1976, p. 180; Parker, 1978, p. 405). Some councils were outright hostile
(McPhail, 1978, p. 111; Bowman, 1983, p. 176). King (1978, p. 108) citeed the
vitriolic remarks of one NSW councillor from Port Stephens challenging a $1M
Commonwealth grant for employment purposes. Councils receiving minimal
financial support were especially bitter (Self, 1985, p. 65). As a result, local
government raised little resistance when the subsequent conservative Fraser
Government, elected in 1975, stopped ROC support and shut down many federal
regional programs. Councils were more preoccupied with coming to grips with
managing their own undertakings rather than pursuing active participation in
additional regional arrangements. As a result, the overwhelming majority of
ROCs foundered.
The DURD’s regional experiments were too short-lived to bear fruit. But
even with more time, their downfall was probably inevitable. The concept of
regional priorities being determined by structures imposed from above was
arguably misplaced. In 1976, Harris suggested that:
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‘[i]t is hardly conceivable that a regional view could emanate from a
Regional Organisation of Councils, or that all local government areas within
a defined region faced sufficiently common problems as local authorities to
enable such a regional view to emerge’ (1976, p. 103).
It appears that this criticism was based on the compulsory nature of the
ROCs, together with the then limited outlook of individual councils, rather than
any lack of appreciation of regional dimensions to municipal activity. Harris
went on to refer to the ‘significant advantages’ of regional cooperation, noting
that some functions such as ‘physical and environmental planning decisions’
were suitable for cross-boundary collaboration (1976, pp. 106-7). In similar
fashion, Power and Wettenhall (1976, p. 118) argued that ‘regionalism …
imposed from above is usually a weaker form than that which could emerge if
the initiatives arose from within the region itself’ (see also Wettenhall and
Power, 1975, p. 208; Gray, 2004). Grounds (1987, p. 1) is more direct in
attributing the ROCs’ ultimate failure to their involuntary nature. Morgan (1993,
p. 4) holds a similar view, pointing to their ‘prescriptive nature and undertones of
compulsion’.
A handful of DURD ROCS have survived, including the Western Sydney
ROC (WSROC), Illawarra ROC (IROC) south of Sydney (now known as the
‘Southern Councils Group’) and the Hunter ROC (HROC, renamed ‘Hunter
Councils Inc’) in the Newcastle region. WSROC then represented Australia’s
most heavily funded region (Fulop and Sheppard, 1988b, p. 615; Fulop and
Sheppard, 1988a, p. 6), which must have helped galvanise municipal
commitment. Those ROCs that outlasted the Fraser Government’s cutbacks did
so only because of financial and political support from member councils. They
tended to be located in socially disadvantaged areas that had fared best under
Whitlam’s fiscal equalisation policies such as, notably, the AIP scheme.
It is at least feasible that the DURD’s efforts helped lay groundwork for later
regional municipal collaboration (McPhail, 1978, p. 111; Orchard, 1999b, p.
200). A novel, ongoing and evolving network of voluntary ROCs has since
arisen from the ashes of DURD. Their purpose, however, is not to provide a
channel for Commonwealth funding. Rather, they themselves seek revenue from
any source available, with co-operative well-crafted grantsmanship skills derived
from earlier experience. This tends to undermine any criticism that the DURD’s
efforts were merely fleeting. It should also be borne in mind that local
government was then turning the corner into functional expansion. Land use
planning schemes were emerging, albeit slowly (Wilcox, 1967, pp. 207-11),
giving councils ‘unprecedented power’ to influence land value through zoning
controls (Harrison, 1988, p. 27). In addition, some councils took the initiative to
embrace the social environment, providing community, welfare and cultural
services such as personal counselling, subsidised meals and arts festivals
(Rentschler, 1997, pp. 130-3; Miles, 1976, p. 175; Walsh, 1989, p. 118). These
fall within the broad umbrella of ‘human’ services (House of Representatives
Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration, 2003a,
p. 10; Dollery, Wallis and Allan, 2006, p. 555; Dollery, 2005, p. 392). For those
councils keen to modernise their portfolios, the Whitlam/Uren government
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provided considerable potential for new ideas.
4. THE COMMONWEALTH’S THIRD INITIATIVE: THE SELFSUFFICIENCY OF THE 1990S
The Commonwealth’s third major entry into regional policy was heralded by
the Taskforce on Regional Development which produced Developing Australia:
A Regional Perspective, chaired by Bill Kelty (Australia. Taskforce on Regional
Development, 1993). The report enjoyed wide release but received strong
criticism due to the unrealisable hopes it engendered for new infrastructural
investment throughout provincial Australia (Alexander, 1994, p. 6; Forth, 1996,
pp. 76-8). Nevertheless, it prompted national debate on regional development
which became a strong element in the Commonwealth’s Working Nation policy
(Fulop, 1997, p. 221; Keating, 1994).
This was one of numerous
contemporaneous documents on regional issues (Beer, 2000a, p. 176), including
the prominent ‘McKinsey Report’ (McKinsey and Company, 1994) which has
been widely regarded as the ‘most influential’ (Fulop and Brennan, 1997, p. 1;
see also Beer, Maude and Pritchard, 2003, p. 15; Fulop, 1997, p. 221). After the
Labor party came to power in 1983 under PM Bob Hawke, the Commonwealth
instituted various regional arrangements but none directly involved local
government (Beer, 2000a, pp. 175-6). A more fervent program based on
‘strategic planning’ arose after the takeover of PM Paul Keating in 1991 (Beer,
2000a, p. 177).
Regional policy under Keating was very different from the Whitlam/Uren
approach. It embraced a heavy emphasis on economic development (Hurley,
1994b, p. 23), still grounded on concerns about regional disparity but less
anxious about redistributive fiscal justice. Whilst the initiative was politically
expedient, it might be argued that it lacked any ‘widely-shared’ philosophical
underpinning other than promoting economic efficiency (Hurley, 1994b, p. 25;
see also Garlick, 1997, p. 277). More recent environmental imperatives such as
‘ecologically sustainable development’ (ESD) were, according to Alexander
(1994, p. 23), ‘effectively sidestepped’.
Major differences from the earlier programs included modesty in funding
(Sorensen, 1994) and a fresh vision of government as facilitator rather than the
driving force (Taylor and Garlick, 1989, p. 99). The deal was to provide a
climate for economic initiative from within the regional communities themselves
(Martin and Woodhill, 1995, p. 174). Hurley (1994a, p. 5) deciphers the regions
as ‘units propelling the national economic wagon ... discouraged from seeing
themselves as recipients of assistance from a state gravy train’. This ethos of
regional self-help saw funds made available under the Regional Development
Program (RDP) for the establishment of voluntary structures, known as Regional
Development Organisations (RDOs, originally known as Regional Economic
Development Organisations), with membership determined by the regional
communities themselves. The earlier pattern of enforced regionalisation was
thus replaced with a novel form of centrally prodded regionalism – i.e. a
federally supported and flexible bottom-up structure. Another parallel program
was the establishment of Area Consultative Committees to assist local
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communities in improving employment levels and training schemes (Beer,
2000a, p. 176).
Because RDOs were to arise from the ground upwards, the issue of top-down
boundary delineation became redundant. It was expected that regional leaders,
from both the private and public sector, would join together to form the new
bodies with their spatial areas of interest reflecting local economic catchments.
RDOs did not emerge everywhere (Beer, 1999, p. 188), and some proved
stronger than others. Municipal borders again formed the ‘building blocks’
although according to Garlick (1999, p. 181), drawing firm lines at the periphery
was not a major issue.
One reason for the formation of new bodies rather than utilising councils was
the Commonwealth’s belief that local government had not played ‘a sufficiently
active role’ in regional economic development (Fulop and Brennan, 1997, p. 21;
see also Munro, 1994, p. 15). According to Forth (1996, p. 81), the
Commonwealth was initially unwilling to support RDOs that were ‘effectively
controlled’ by local government.
Yet such opposition ignored local
government’s traditional preoccupation with boosting local economic growth as
had been recognised by PM Curtin as far back as the 1940s. As Marshall noted
(1997, p. 13), the Working Nation document stipulated that local government
was assumed to provide a ‘key role ... in initiating and establishing RDOs’.
Local government was quick to position itself as a key stakeholder. It generally
saw itself as having the ‘biggest stake’ in regional development, thereby wanting
to ‘play a dominating role’ in controlling RDO agendas (Fulop and Brennan,
1997, p. 21). A survey of RDO personnel confirms local government’s heavy
involvement, including substantial contribution to RDO funding (Marshall, 1997,
p. 13). Northwood (1995, p. 32) refers to Local government’s ‘pivotal’ role,
providing examples of close linkages between voluntary ROCs and RDOs.
In 1996, the newly elected Howard Government abolished the RDP, resulting
in the dismantling of most RDOs across the country. Whilst some RDOs
survived, in other places local government filled the gap via voluntary ROCs. It
appears that regional economic development has since been a dominating
concern in voluntary ROC circles. Significantly, the Commonwealth never
dictated the functions of RDOs but made funds available for the preparation of
regional economic strategies. Implementation of such strategies, of course, was
scarcely straightforward (Murphy and Walker, 1995, p. 128). The RDOs had no
political constituency, organisational experience or reliable income beyond the
lifetimes of their grants. It is interesting to speculate whether local government,
given the same opportunity, would have achieved more.
A chief lesson from the RDP experience is the sheer vulnerability of central
government regional programs. Despite the potential popularity of a regional
scheme, it will always be liable to abandonment upon change in political
direction. There is, of course, no lasting tradition of regional structures in
Australia. But the RDP did attract a level of council interest that had been absent
during previous excursions into the regional arena. This may be explained, in
part, by local government having become a far more aggressive and sophisticated
institution. But more importantly, RDOs were voluntary. Local government
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was prepared to jostle with other stakeholders to claim its share of the funding
pie and play an active role in shaping regional priorities. It did not want to be
left behind, believing it had an essential, if not the cardinal, contribution to make.
This illustrates the point that bottom-up regionalism is unlikely to emerge by
itself but requires some form of financial, administrative and/or policy push. It
also exemplifies modern local government’s keen nose for new funding sources
(Harris, 1976, p. 106).
A significant result of RDO activity was unevenness. Some regions suffering
from ‘geographical spread, lack of regional identity or political disunity’ suffered
from obvious disadvantages (Murphy and Walker, 1995, p. 125). Remoteness
and sparseness of populations will always mitigate against successful crossboundary structures. Additional funding to bring people together may help. Yet
most successful RDOs depended largely on ‘personality and local goodwill’
(Murphy and Walker, 1995, p. 125). Such ingredients are vital. They will not be
manufactured by legislation or new funding sources alone.
5. SUBSEQUENT DIRECTIONS
After the fall of the Keating Government in 1996 and the ascendancy of
conservative PM John Howard, the Commonwealth initially set up no major
regional structures after dispensing with the RDP (Beer, 1999, p. 188). Yet the
claim that Commonwealth interest in regional development policy ‘evaporated’
(Beer, 2000b, p. 114) under the Howard Government can be assessed, with
hindsight, to be overstated. The Commonwealth did not ignore local problems,
especially after its re-election in 2002 when rural councils could compete against
a wide spectrum of community bodies for funding under a variety of programs
(Beer, Maude and Pritchard, 2003, pp. 261-2). These were not driven by
environmental needs, but by community wants. It is arguable that such moves
were designed to assuage disgruntled rural citizens, who saw themselves as left
behind in the expanding benefits of national urban economic growth. In fact, the
level of funding was higher than what had been offered under PM Keating (Beer,
Maude and Pritchard, 2003, p. 261). Again, local government was only one
party at the coalface. This was a time of increasing demands on councils, many
of which might have regarded the new arrangements as peripheral.
Collits (2007, pp. 186-7) also draws attention to a later initiative of the
Howard government to establish a panel to undertake ‘Regional Business
Development Analysis’. Similar to PM Keating’s experiment; this afforded a
funded ‘bottom-up’ approach but did not establish or even support any particular
regional arrangements. Instead, it relied on the three spheres of government
operating together in a strategic manner. Whilst the concept may have offered
some benefits, it was cut short. Perhaps the traditional local political fear against
regional government remained afoot.
Moreover, the Howard government continued to fund the Area Consultative
Committees initiated by the Keating government in 1994, although the role of
these Committees changed from one being concerned principally with the issue
of regional employment (as was initially stipulated with their formation under
the Employment Services Act 1994) (Albanese, 2008, p.2), to funding a variety
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of types of projects, including educational programs, business alliances,
investment strategies, adjustment packages and grant writing workshops, all
under an extended charter within the framework of the Regional Partnerships
Program. While there was no mandated involvement of local government, the
interface in terms of projects and personnel was in some instances marked (see,
for example, NENWACC, 2002).
Two other areas of policy pursued by the Howard government involved
significant funds being directed toward the regions. The first of these was the
use of Natural Resource Management (NRM) bodies to address environmental
degradation and ecological sustainability. Summarising this effort, Moore (2005,
p. 123) noted that National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality Program
(NAP) was initially targeted at 21 ‘designated priority catchment areas across
Australia’ and as such was regionally directed. It involved initial funding of $1.4
billion over seven years. Although a proportion of the initial funding came from
state and territory governments, it was topped up through a National Heritage
Trust amount of $1.5 billion in 2001, with a further $300 million added in 2004
to cover all 56 regions in Australia. Moore (2005, p. 125) offered the view that as
well as addressing concerns of environmental sustainability, ‘regionalising
provide[d] a framework for progressing the government’s self-help approach’.
The second major initiative taken by the Howard government was the Roads
to Recovery (R2R) funding, designed to address the problem of local road
infrastructure nearing the end of its useful life and where replacement costs were
deemed to be outside the financial capability of local government. Summarising
this funding, Dollery, Pape and Byrnes (2006, pp. 2-3) noted that 70 percent of
the initial $1.2 billion (or $850 million) was designated to rural and regional
Australia from the period January 2001 to June 2005. Additionally, a 2002
review of the program extended this funding to 2009 with an additional $2.55
billion in funding. While Dollery, Pape and Byrnes (2006, p. 3) noted the
program was subject to the [pedestrian] criticism of pork-barrelling, of far more
significance were their observations that ‘R2R has broken with longstanding
tradition in Australian fiscal federalism by its sheer scale in bypassing state and
territory governments that have typically redistributed federal funding to local
government through their Local Government Grants Commissions.’ Moreover,
they speculated that ‘it may also violate the Constitution’ and sought to
demonstrate how this view could be taken (Dollery, Pape and Byrnes, 2006, pp.
7-12).
Taken together, the federal funding of NRM bodies at a regional level and the
funding of the R2R program directly to local government would appear to
signify a break with post-war liberal governments’ scaling down of
programmatic financial commitment to regional development relative to their
Labor counterparts, and to the financial support of local government in
particular. Further, a recent challenge to the federal government’s legality in
delivering its ‘Nation Building and Jobs Plan’ in the High Court by Pape in Pape
vs. Commissioner of Taxation of Australia (2009) (High Court of Australia,
2009) signalled the potential for continued constitutional implications. While on
the one hand ALGA President Geoff Lake welcomed the High Court’s decision

Regional Development, Local Government & Federal Intervention

185

to reject the constitutional challenge to the Federal Government’s stimulus
package, with its potential implication that ‘councils [would be] required to pay
back in the order of $6 billion of [federal] funding that has flowed to local
government over the last few years’, on the other hand, he stated that: ’the
uncertainty that this case created has the potential to arise again and indeed a
differently composed High Court in the future could well decide these sorts of
matters in a different way’; further asserting that the issue of funding would not
be resolved until the Constitution was amended such that Federal government
could directly fund local government (Government News, 2009). We will return
to this issue in our concluding remarks below.
Arguably, however, the greatest legacy of the Howard government to
regional policy and local government was its launching of major reports
emphasising the financial un-sustainability of local government (see Brown,
2005, pp. 29-32), including Rates and Taxes: A Fair Share for Responsible Local
government (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics,
Finance and Public Administration, 2003a; known as the ‘Hawker Report’). This
key document, preceded by At the Crossroads – A Discussion Paper (House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public
Administration, 2003b), has been dubbed ‘the most comprehensive recent
diagnosis on the ills of Australian local government’ (Dollery, 2005, p. 385). It
highlighted local government’s entrenched nature, functional expansion and
ballooning financial desperation, even warning councils against entering
functional territory beyond their financial capacity (House of Representatives
Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration, 2003a,
pp. 14-5). This latter concern was re-echoed by the recent ‘FiscalStar’ report
which warned that ‘financially unsustainable’ councils ‘face substantial
rates/prices hikes or drastic services cutbacks (or both)’ (FiscalStar Services Pty
Ltd, 2008, p. 4). The response, undoubtedly, will be an ongoing march in favour
of reduction of council numbers. In his discussion of the Hawker Report,
Dollery (2005, p. 389) attacked its consideration of the ‘advantages’ of enforced
amalgamation as ‘draconian’. At the same time, the Hawker Report also
considered the benefits of a direct financial pipeline from the Commonwealth to
local government, harking back to the Whitlam era (Brown, 2005, p. 30).
Overall, the Howard government did not forsake local government. Yet more
was needed than thoughtful and disturbing reports and targeted funding programs
for the electorally sensitive issues such of environmental sustainability and local
roads.
6. CONCLUSION
The historical narrative sketched in this paper offers more than a fascinating
story of municipal history. Whilst cross-boundary approaches appear more than
desirable, the history of regional structures pushed by the Commonwealth
government suggests implementation is another matter altogether. Despite
various experiments, regional bodies with political power have never become a
fixed part of the enduring regional administrative landscape. Commonwealth
regionalisation in particular has always been controversial. Attempts to impose
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regional institutions from above have overwhelmingly failed due to a
combination of poor planning, insufficient support, change in political climate
and opposition from other spheres of government. Local government has
traditionally displayed a negative attitude, concerned about loss of dignity and
potential amalgamation. Yet its experience with the RDP during the 1990s
signalled a softening of its conventional ‘dog in the manger’ mindset.
However, it cannot be overlooked that local government is far more
sophisticated than it was over a decade ago. Whilst this may not be the case for
remote struggling authorities, such councils are still vital to their local
communities. What is most interesting is that councils are becoming more
confident in building up alliances and devising protocols with other local bodies,
government agencies, the private sector and social organisations. The spectrum
of efficient, flexible and legitimate models is wide (Dollery and Johnson, 2005;
Dollery and Johnson, 2007). Even upwards delegation of specified functions to
statutory regional bodies, such as county councils in NSW, provides an option
(Kelly, 2003). It is here where improved cross-border approaches may evolve
without direct requirements imposed from above. The FAG system could be
reviewed with a separate portion of funding devoted to acceptable regional
planning, leaving elected councils to design their own preferred subsystems.
This could demonstrate consistency with the subsidiarity principle, which has yet
to be largely accepted in Australia (Aulich, 2005, p. 209). Any council that
chooses not to be involved will receive no funding and remain answerable to its
electorate. Regional environmental management would be a good place to
revise, revitalise or start anew. Flexibility rather than rigidity must be the key.
Beyond these positive, although incremental initiatives, the fact remains that
the Commonwealth government is the only sphere with sufficient resources to
support regional structures (Beer, 2000a, p. 170). The Howard government’s
funding of both NRM and R2R, when placed in historical continuum with the
recent initiatives of the Rudd government, including the funding of the Local
Infrastructure Program to the amount of $800 million (thus far) and the initiation
of the Australian Council of Local Government (ACLG) in late 2008 under the
newly christened Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional
Development and Local Government (DTIRDLG, 2009) may signal a bipartisan
approach (albeit by default) toward what Brown (2005, pp. 17-18) then regarded
as highly unlikely, namely ‘a reversion to an interventionist, Keynesian or high
investment approach’. Moreover, for the first time, constitutional recognition is
not just a partisan political issue (as it was in 1974 and, to a lesser extent, in
1988), but has to be explored through the High Court and canvassed more
broadly throughout the polity.
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